What are we fighting for?
I’ve written about this topic at least a half dozen times now, I’ve saved each one as a draft and I’m giving up – I’m asking for help. I was inspired to do this by a video “Where Good Ideas Come From” (Bob Blakely posted the link in twitter). I can’t find the answer to this puzzle, at least not in any meaningful way, not by myself. I’ll break down where I am in the thought process and hope that I get some feedback. (note: For the purpose of this discussion I’m using “security” as a group of people and technology intended to protect assets.)
The goal of business is pretty well understood. For-profit companies are after profit and all the things that would affect that, reputation and customer confidence being on the top of the list for information security. From a business perspective, what I think is considered a successful security program is spending just enough on security and not too much. Spending too much on security should not be considered a success as well as failed security (though not equally). The goal isn’t perfect security, the goal is managed security. There is a point of diminishing returns in that spending, at some point there is just enough security.
I think of a production line manufacturing some physical widget. While it’d be really cool to have zero defects, most businesses spend just enough to make the product defects within some tolerance level. Translating to infosec, the goal from a business perspective is to spend enough (on security) to meet some level of business risk tolerance. That opens up a whole different discussion that I’ll avoid for now. But my point is that there should be a holistic view to information security. Since the goal of protecting information is only one variable to reach the goal of being profitable – there could easily be a good decision to increase spending and training for public relations staff to respond to any breach rather than preventing a specific subset of breaches themselves. Having the goal in mind enables those types of flexible trade offs.
Most every infosec talk I go to the goal appears to be security for the sake of security. In other words, the goal is to have not have security fail. The result is that the focus is shifted onto prevention and statements of risk stop short of being meaningful. “If X and Y happen an attacker will have an account on host Z.” is a statement on security, not risk. It’s a statement of action with impact to security not an impact to the broader goal. This type of focus devalues detective controls in the overall risk/value statement (everyone creates a mental measurement of risk/value in their own head). Once a detective control like logging is triggered in a breach, the security breach has occurred. The gap is in that the real reason we’re fighting—the bigger picture—the goal, hasn’t yet been impacted. However, and this is important, because the risk is perceived from a security perspective, emphasis and priorities are often misplaced. Hence, the question in the title. I don’t think we should be fighting for good security, we should be fighting for good-enough security.
I think this may be a special case where the goal is in fact security, but I have very little experience here. I won’t waste time pontificating on the goals for government. But this type of thing factors into the discussion. If infosec in government has a different goal then private enterprises, where are the differences and similarities?
The simple statement of “Compliance != Security” implies that the goal is security. What are we fighting for? It becomes pretty clear why some of the compliant yet “bad” security decisions were made if we consider that the goal wasn’t security. Compliance is a business concern, the correlation to infosec is both a blessing and curse.
Where am I heading?
So I’m seeing two major gaps as I type this. First thing is I don’t think there is any type of consensus around what our goal is in information security. My current thought is that perfect security is not the goal and that security is just a means to some other end. I think we should be focusing on where that end is and how we define “just enough” security in order to meet that. But please, help me understand that.
Second thing is the problem this causes, the “so what” of this post. We lack the ability to communicate security and consequently risk because we’re talking apples and oranges. I’ve been there, I’ve laid out a clear and logical case why some security thingamabob would improve security only to get some lame answer as to why I was shot down. I get that now. I wasn’t headed in the same direction as others in the conversation. The solution went towards my goal of security, not our goal of business. Once we’re all headed towards the same goals we can align assumptions and start to have more productive discussions.
For those who’ve watched that video I linked to in the opening, I’ve got half an idea. It’s been percolating for a long time and I can’t seem to find the trigger that unifies this mess. I’m putting this out there to hopefully trigger a response – a “here’s what I’m fighting for” type response. Because I think we’ve been heading in a dangerous direction focusing on security for the sake of security.